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This report is based on the second stage of a two-stage survey of the December 1998-
February 1999 cohort of entrants to New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed (ND25+)
Pilots and a matched comparison sample from outside Pilot areas, which took place just
over 18 months after participants had entered the programme. The analyses on which it is
based assess Pilot effects in relation to three main outcome measures – employment entry
and unemployment exit, employability and job quality. The primary evaluation approach
adopted is known as the method of matching. This technique makes use of the wide range
of background information on respondents that was collected from the survey,
supplemented by information from the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating
System (JUVOS) and the New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED), to enhance the
matched comparison group design and increase the extent to which Pilot effects are
estimated from comparisons of like with like. The use of JUVOS and NDED data also
made it possible to track clients’ progress in terms of employment entry and
unemployment exit up to December 2000. This gave an evaluation period following
programme entry of about two years, comprising the greater part of the calendar years
1999 and 2000.
Pilot effects on employment entry and exit from JSA
Analyses based on matching in the context of a matched comparison group
evaluation design produced the following main findings:-
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants out of
unemployment. This was the case for the evaluation period as a whole and
for 1999 and 2000 considered separately. Effects were found in relation to
both exits from JSA and time off JSA, so that once the programme had
enabled participants to leave unemployment, they tended not to return.
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants to enter employment.
• Pilot effects on both employment entry and unemployment exit were stronger
for this cohort in 1999 than in 2000. Indeed, Pilot effects on employment
entry had become non-significant in 2000 for this cohort. The diminution of
the Pilot advantage over the comparison sample in terms of employment
entry and unemployment exit could be due either to the atrophy of Pilot
effects or to a ‘catching-up’ process on the part of the comparison group. The
available evidence suggested the latter was more likely. Pilot respondents
had higher employment entry and unemployment exit levels in 2000 than
1999, but by this year many members of the comparison group had
accumulated substantial experience under the national ND25+ programme,
which after April 2000 was improved so that the Gateway more closely
resembled that in the Pilots. It is perhaps not surprising that a reduction of the
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Pilot advantage coincided with many members of the comparison sample
receiving assistance that included some elements of Pilot provision.
Attempts were also made to estimate the separate impact of different elements
of Pilot provision, especially the Gateway and Intensive Activity Period (IAP).
This proved particularly difficult in relation to the former, but it was possible to
establish that both had a discernible impact and that movements off JSA from
the Gateway were almost certainly more pronounced than from the IAP. The
effect of IAP seemed more sustained, however, and was not weakening at the
end of the evaluation period.
It was also possible to establish that Pilot provision was effective in both 12 month entry
and 18 month entry areas but there was no indication that intervention at 12 months was
more effective than at 18 months, or vice-versa. This result is somewhat surprising given
that internal ES monitoring of JUVOS data has consistently shown that 18 month
intervention is more effective than at 12 months in terms of off-flows from JSA. The
finding of no significant differences between 12 and 18 month intervention in this
research might stem from the fact that people in the 18 month comparison group became
eligible for national New Deal provision sooner than those in the 12 month comparison
group, thus reducing the 18 month effect.
Among New Deal opportunities, positive effects were found for Employer
Subsidy but Education and Training Opportunities and Work Based Learning for
Adults had a negative or no impact.
Pilot effects on employability
Raising participants’ employability is one of the primary ways in which an active
labour market programme can influence job entry chances beyond the
immediate evaluation period. This is because improving employability implies
developing the skills and capacities likely to increase participants’ labour market
prospects over the medium- to long-term.
The analyses of employability focussed primarily, therefore, on respondents who
were not in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview. These respondents
are ones who have found it relatively hard to enter work during the evaluation
period, so analyses of employability are particularly important for them. In the
absence of objective measures of employability, measures of in-work training,
qualifications, job search, self-efficacy and attachment to the labour market were
derived from survey responses and used as proxies for ‘employability’.
Analysing self-assessed measures of employability of this type provided very
little evidence to suggest that Pilot provision had raised employability. The only
significant effect detected was that Pilot entrants had higher wage expectations
than their comparators. This is more likely to reduce their chances of entering
work over the medium- to long-term rather than increase it, because having
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higher wage expectations reduces the range of job offers a person is likely to find
acceptable. While higher wage expectations may be evidence of greater self-
confidence on the part of Pilot participants, this conclusion was not supported by
the analysis of self-efficacy. What is perhaps more likely is that the greater
effectiveness of Pilot provision raised expectations with regard to programme
impacts and these encouraged participants to have higher wage expectations. A
paradox of the programme is that raising expectations in this way might make it
harder for those participants who do not enter employment in the short-term to
do so in the medium- to long-term, because these higher expectations will make
the participants less employable.
Pilot effects on job quality
As was the case with the analyses of employability, very few differences
emerged between the Pilot and comparison samples in relation to the quality of
jobs they held at the time of the stage 2 survey. The only reliable difference was
that Pilot entrants had lower levels of job satisfaction than their comparators.
There were no differences between the samples, however, in relation to wages
or wage progression. This finding is consistent with that of higher wage
expectations reported for Pilot participants, referred to above. Given their higher
wage expectations, Pilot participants would perhaps be expected to show lower
levels of satisfaction with jobs that paid no more than those of their comparators.
Conclusions
Taken together, these findings present a comprehensive picture of how Pilot
provision affected recipients’ labour market experiences during a relatively short
period after the introduction of the programme. The weight of evidence suggests
that the Pilots were able to quickly improve the labour market prospects of many
participants, as shown by the positive Pilot effects on job entry, JSA exit and time
off JSA in the first year of the evaluation period, 1999. It is not possible to say
how long these large effects would have persisted if the comparison sample had
continued to receive little assistance from employment programmes in the
second half of the evaluation period, but as they started to spend more time on
New Deal in 2000 the Pilot effects lessened and, in the case of employment
effects, disappeared.
The analyses of employability gave no suggestion that Pilot participants who had
not found a job before the end of the evaluation period would have more success
in this regard than similar people from the comparison sample over the next few
years. ND25+ Pilot provision did not seem to enhance employability, at least as
proxied by survey responses on items such as in-work training, qualifications, job
search, self-efficacy and attachment to the labour market, in the way that some
elements of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) programme have done.
This suggests that the positive Pilot effects identified in this report represent a
large proportion of the overall advantage over the comparison sample likely to be
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enjoyed by this cohort of participants. To some extent, this is consistent with the
more intensive, work-first ethos of ND25+ Pilot provision compared with, for
example, NDYP. As a programme of this type, there is considerable evidence to
suggest it has been a success.
1. The evaluation approach
1.1 The method of matching
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There are a number of possible ways of evaluating active labour market
programmes and the choice of best approach is determined in large part by
practicalities.  Specifically, the nature of the programme and the quality of data
available for analysis are key factors. As was explained in the previous chapter,
this study was designed as a matched comparison group evaluation and retains
the positive features of that approach. It is enhanced, however, by the use of
propensity score matching (or, more simply, ‘matching’). The matching
methodology is described in more detail in this chapter.
For the purposes of illustrating how the matching technique works, the effect is
considered of programme participation on the probability of having found
employment at a subsequent point in time. The obvious way of doing this is to
compare the proportion employed among those who participated and those who
did not participate.  However, the results of such comparisons will be misleading
if certain characteristics of participants differ substantially from those of non-
participants.  More specifically, if participants had more favourable labour market
characteristics than non-participants before entering the programme, one would
expect them to have had more success in finding employment even if they had
not taken part in the programme.
In order to identify the effect of the programme on employment, one must therefore take
account of the participants’ likely employment prospects had they not participated.
Subtracting this from the actual result yields an estimate of programme effect.  However,
the difficulty arises from the fact that only actual employment is observed rather than
hypothetical employment prospects that would have resulted from participants not
participating.  What is needed in order to estimate the programme effect is the
employment prospects for those who participated had they not participated.
The results provided by the simplistic approach of comparing the proportion employed
among participants and non-participants implicitly assume that the prospects of non-
participants provide a reasonable estimate of the prospects of participants had they not
participated.  The method of matching improves upon this by considering only that subset
of non-participants who are in some sense similar to participants.  Hence, their
employment prospects can be regarded as a better indicator of the employment prospects
of participants had they not participated since the comparison is essentially of like with
like. In the case of the ND25+ Pilots, the efficacy of the programme is estimated in
relation to a comparison sample of non-participants.  Hence, an estimate is needed of how
individuals who experienced Pilot participation would have fared if they had instead been
in the comparison sample.
It is useful to provide an outline of the process involved in carrying out the
matching.  There are essentially two stages.  First, models of Pilot participation
are estimated.  Second, individuals are matched using the resulting estimates of
probability of Pilot participation. Each individual in the Pilot sample is matched
with that individual in the comparison sample with the most similar probability of
being in the Pilot sample.  Comparing the proportion in employment of the Pilot
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participants with that of this matched group provides an estimate of the
employment effect of the Pilots.1
1.2 Matching results
In this section, the results of the matching approach are presented.  The analysis is based
on those members of the December 1998-February 1999 cohort who responded to the
stage 2 interview. As only 38 per cent of the sample frame responded to the stage 2
survey, it was necessary to construct sample weights in order to lessen the consequent
biases in the estimates of programme effects. These were used in the estimation of Pilot
participation (the first stage of the matching process).
Descriptive statistics
Before proceeding to the analysis proper, it is helpful to consider how the characteristics
of the Pilot sample differed from those of the comparison sample. Some indication of this
is provided in Table 1.1 below.
Overall, the Pilot and comparison samples had very similar characteristics. This is
particularly the case in relation to housing tenure, education and employment and
unemployment experience prior to the evaluation period. There are some differences in
relation to personal characteristics: a greater proportion of the comparison sample was
female while a higher proportion of the Pilot sample was partnered. The greatest
differences, however, are to be found in relation to the regional location of respondents.
Pilot respondents are over-represented in the North West and South West, while the
comparison sample has concentrations in Yorkshire and Humberside, the West Midlands
and the East Midlands and Eastern region. These differences emerged because the best
match for a Pilot area was often to be found outside the region in which it was located.
There are also some small differences to be found in relation to local area characteristics.
Despite this variable being used in the matching process, Pilot areas were found to have
slightly higher local area unemployment rates in 1997 than comparison areas. This
illustrates the difficulty, referred to earlier, of finding close area matches. Pilot areas also
tended, on average, to have higher proportions of their workforce with a disability and
lower proportions of ethnic minorities.
                                           
1 A more detailed and technical exposition of the method of matching is provided at Appendix 2.
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample
Pilot Comparison
Personal characteristics
Age at beginning of evaluation period (mean) 41 40
Female (%) 18 22
Partnered (%) 35 31
Widowed, divorced or separated (%) 17 17
From ethnic minority (%) 6 8
Housing tenure
- Social housing (%) 53 54
- Owner occupier (%) 29 26
- Private renter (%) 16 18
- Other (%) 2 2
Education
Left full-time education aged 14 or younger (%) 6 4
Left full-time education at 15 (%) 28 28
Left full-time education at 16 (%) 36 36
Left full-time education at 17 or 18 (%) 18 17
Left full-time education aged 19 or over (%) 13 15
Previous experience of  unemployment
Been on government programme before ND (%) 37 35
No. of JSA claims since January 1995 (mean) 2 2
Length of unemployment spell pre ND (months) 17 17
Industry of longest job before evaluation period
Extraction, manufacturing and construction (%) 33 34
Distribution, transport and communications (%) 19 21
Business and financial services (%) 8 7
Other services (%) 14 15
Never worked or missing (%) 26 23
Occupation of longest job before evaluation period
Manager or professional (%) 9 8
Associate professional or technical (%) 4 3
Clerical (%) 8 11
Craft and related (%) 20 17
Personal and protective services (%) 6 5
Sales (%) 6 7
Process operatives (%) 16 16
Other (%) 28 32
Never worked or missing (%) 3 1
Local area characteristics
Local area unemployment rate in 1997 (%) 7 6
Proportion of local workforce from ethnic minority (%) 8 9




North West 11 3
Yorkshire and Humberside 10 14
Wales 7 5
West Midlands 8 12
East Midlands and East Anglia 10 17
South West 14 7
London and the South East 21 24
Base         1193       808
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Results of estimating the Pilot participation equation
The first stage in the matching process is to model the probability of Pilot participation as
opposed to being in the comparison sample. This is done by estimating a binomial
logistic regression model where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent
is in the Pilot sample and 0 if the respondent is in the comparison sample. From this
model, ‘propensity scores’ are calculated as the estimated probability of Pilot
participation.  It is these scores that are used to perform the match, as noted earlier.  In
view of the central importance of these scores in deriving an adequate match, it is
instructive to consider the estimation results. These are given in Table 1.2.
It is only necessary to include those variables that influence both participation and
outcomes.  The outcomes under consideration are those relating to labour market effects.
For example, the effect of Pilot participation on the probability of finding unsubsidised
employment.  ‘Softer’ outcomes such as employability are also considered.  The rationale
for including variables that influence both participation and outcomes is that if a variable
influences participation but not outcome, there is no need to control for the differences
between the treatment and the control groups for this variable since the outcome variable
of interest is unaffected. 2 Alternatively, if the variable influences outcome but not
participation, there is no need to control for it since it will be insignificantly different in
the treatment and comparison groups. Variables that affect neither participation nor
outcome are clearly unimportant, so the only remaining type of variable is the kind that
influences both participation and outcome – and these are the ones needed to match. To
include additional variables may increase the probability that there is no close match for a
treated individual.  However, the proportion of the sample discarded due to lack of
support was quite small so the approach adopted was to estimate the participation model
using a comprehensive set of explanatory variables.3
As a general comment, the results tend to confirm the differences shown in the simple
descriptive statistics in Table 1.1.  For example, the Pilot sample were considerable more
likely than the comparison sample to be located in the South West according to the
descriptive statistics and this variable predicted Pilot entry. Similarly, higher local area
unemployment rates predicted Pilot entry, as one would expect from the descriptive data.
Overall however, the model shown in Table 2.1 underlines how similar the samples are
even before matching has been carried out. More than 50 variables were used to predict
Pilot entry but less than 10 of these were statistically significant. This suggests that the
individual and area matching carried out as an integral part of the original evaluation
design had worked to good effect.
                                           
2 In particular, whether or not the area in which a client lives is chosen as a Pilot area has no effect on the
likelihood that they would have left JSA or entered employment in the absence of the Pilots, so it does not
therefore enter the propensity score model – even though it clearly affects participation.
3 In fact, only nine members of the Pilot sample (1 per cent) were discarded due to lack of support.
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Age at beginning of evaluation period 0.2920
Female -0.2877 5
Partnered 0.1760
Widowed, divorced or separated 0.1129
From ethnic minority -0.2815
Education
Left full-time education aged 14 or younger (%) 0.2920
Left full-time education at 15 (%) -0.1348
Left full-time education at 17 or 18 (%) -0.0112
Left full-time education aged 19 or over (%) -0.2065
Previous experience of  unemployment
Been on government programme pre evaluation
period (%)
0.0853
No. of JSA claims since January 1995 (mean) -0.0708
Length of unemployment spell pre evaluation period
(months)
0.0080
Industry of longest job before evaluation period
Extraction, manufacturing and construction (%) -0.4054
Distribution, transport and communications (%) -0.1970
Business and financial services (%) 0.1785
Other services (%) -0.7215 10
Occupation of longest job before evaluation period
Manager 0.4828
Professional 0.5523
Associate professional or technical (%) 0.3528
Clerical (%) -0.0133
Craft and related (%) 0.2391
Personal and protective services (%) 0.6997 5
Sales (%) -0.2306




Associate professional and technical 0.0742
Clerical 0.1789




Local area unemployment rate in 1997 (%) 0.4219 1
Proportion of local workforce from ethnic minority (%) 0.2239




North West 0.9514 1
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.2321
Wales 0.3190
West Midlands 0.1749
East Midlands and East Anglia -0.2922
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South West 0.6642 1
Notes
The reference categories for dummy variables were as follows:- for female, male; for partnered, single
never married; for widowed, divorced or separated, single never married; for ethnic minority, white; for age
left full-time education, 16; for whether been on government programme before evaluation period, no; for
industry of longest job before evaluation period, no job or no industry given; for occupation of longest job
before evaluation period, other, no job before evaluation period or none given; for occupation sought, other
or missing; for region, London and the South East.    
Identifying the counterfactual
Having estimated the probability models and associated propensity scores, the next step
in the matching process is to identify the counterfactual for each treated person.  This wad
done by finding, for each individual in the Pilot sample, that individual in the comparison
sample with the most similar propensity score. Having discarded unsupported individuals,
of whom there were very few, the matching process concludes by finding, for each Pilot
participant, a counterfactual person from the comparison sample.  This may result in
individuals being used as comparators more than once.  Should this happen, such
individuals receive a weight that corresponds to the number of times they serve as
comparators.  Hence, the sum of weights in the comparison sample is equal to the number
of observations in the Pilot sample.
It is important to examine the extent to which comparators are used more than once as
over-reliance on single observations may reduce the precision of the estimates of
programme effects. The mean weight attached to members of the comparison group was
2.5. This means that each member of the comparison sample who was matched to a
member of the Pilot sample provided a counterfactual for an average of 2.5 Pilot
participants.4 There is very little to judge this against but it appears within the range
presented by Lechner (1999). Similarly, the distribution of these weights seems to suggest
that there is not an unacceptably great reliance on a small number of comparators. To
illustrate, the decile of comparators with the largest weights provide counterfactuals for
35 per cent of the Pilot sample. Again, this appears reasonable in the light of the limited
available evidence from other studies (Gerfin and Lechner, 2000; Lechner 1999).
1.3 Assessment
In this chapter, the matching approach was described and the results of implementing the
matching were presented.  This forms the basis for much of the subsequent analysis of
programme effects associated with the ND25+ Pilots hence it rewards detailed
consideration.  The results have shown that the models of Pilot participation appear
plausible and include a number of significant variables in all cases.  This, together with
the rich variable set used in the modelling, provides some reassurance that the matching
approach is successfully controlling for those characteristics that might be expected to
                                           
4 479 respondents from the comparison sample (59 per cent) were used to provide matches. The remaining
329 (41 per cent) were not used in the matching analyses.
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result in differences in outcomes between Pilot participants and the comparison sample.
The information on the resulting matching weights and the remaining differences between
the treatment and comparison groups in each case appear acceptable.  In view of this, it is
appropriate to examine the effects of Pilot participation by simply comparing mean
differences.  The matching approach is assumed to have successfully controlled for
variations in outcome caused by differences in the characteristics of Pilot participants and
the comparison sample.5
2. Impacts on employment entry and
unemployment exit
                                           
5 Further analyses (not reported here) were carried out in order to test whether the matching process had
controlled for variations in outcome caused by differences in the characteristics of Pilot participants and the
comparison sample. This involved constructing logistic regression models that explained employment entry
and unemployment exit and including as explanatory variables many of the factors included in the matching
models. Indicators of Pilot participation were also included in these models, along with variables that
sought to control for selection into Pilot participation. The results of these more traditional evaluation
exercises indicated Pilot effects on employment entry and unemployment exit that were broadly consistent
with those reported in the following chapter, which suggests that the matching process had controlled for
variations in outcome caused by differences in the characteristics of Pilot participants and the comparison
sample this some success. It should be noted, however, that these are markedly different types of analysis
and that direct comparisons between their results would be crude.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the effects of Pilot participation on employment entry and unemployment
exit are considered. In most cases, the findings are based on the matching results
presented earlier, which take the form of simple comparisons in average levels of a
particular outcome for those participants in the Pilot sample relative to those in the
comparison sample. Where sample numbers were not sufficient to carry out matching
however, comparisons are made using regression techniques. A number of outcome
measures are considered drawing on both the survey data and the administrative data and
these will be described in more detail below. The chapter begins by considering the
overall effects of Pilot participation and then moves on to differentiate between different
elements of Pilot provision, especially the Gateway and Intensive Activity Period. The
impact of New Deal opportunities is also considered and analyses are conducted to
examine whether the Pilot effect varied by area type.
2.2 Pilot effects on exits from Jobseekers Allowance (JSA)
Pilot effects on the chances of leaving JSA were estimated using information from the
Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS). JUVOS data was
available for the whole of the evaluation period, covering the years 1999 and 2000, and
analyses were carried out relating both to the period as a whole and particular segments of
it. It was important to differentiate between programme effects observed during different
parts of the evaluation period since, as described in Chapter One, the services available to
the comparison sample changed substantially as the evaluation period progressed.
As well as providing information on whether a client has left JSA, the JUVOS data
indicates their reason for leaving, as long as the client supplies this information. The
‘reason for claim end’ variable in JUVOS has around twenty categories, which is clearly
too many for use in econometric analyses. For this reason, the exit information was
combined into five categories. Table 2.1 indicates how this was done. It also shows the
proportion of the sample that was in each JUVOS ‘reason for claim end’ category as of
December 2000.
Those respondents still claiming JSA at a particular point in time are classified as such.
Where respondents are no longer claiming JSA and the reason given for their most recent
exit from JSA was ‘found work’ or ‘jobseeker works on average 16+ hours’, they are
classified as having left for either unsubsidised or subsidised employment. They cannot
be allocated to these categories on the basis of JUVOS data because it does not contain
information on whether the job was obtained via an Employer Subsidy as part of New
Deal. In order to do this, the date of exit from JSA was compared with any information on
the date of entry to the Employer Subsidy opportunity from the New Deal Evaluation
Database (NDED). Where a date for Employer Subsidy entry existed, and where it
coincided with a date of exit from JSA that was due to finding work, this exit was
classified as one to subsidised employment. All other exits to ‘found work’ or ‘jobseeker
works 16+ hours’ were classified as unsubsidised employment.
ND25+ Pilots: quantitative evaluation using stage 2 survey
xvi
Table 2.1 JUVOS reason for claim end
JUVOS reason for claim end Combined category Number
Still claiming JSA (45%) Still claiming JSA 1
Found work (23%) Left JSA for unsubsidised
employment
2
Jobseeker works on average 16+ hours
(1%)
Left JSA for unsubsidised
employment
2
Found work (2%) Left JSA for subsidised
employment
3
Jobseeker works on average 16+ hours
(*%)
Left JSA for subsidised
employment
3
Claimed Incapacity Benefits (9%) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Transfer to government training (4%) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Claimed Income Support (4%) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Claimed another benefit (3%) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Retired (1%) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Full-time education (* %) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Automatic credits (* %) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Sickness Benefit claimed (* %) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Approved training (* %) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Deceased (* %) Left JSA for economic inactivity 4
Failed to attend (4%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Other reason (2%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Ceased claiming (2%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Gone abroad (* %) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Defective claim (*%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Unknown reason (*%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
Unclassified exits (*%) Left JSA for unknown destination 5
A large number of JUVOS reasons for claim end were combined as exits to economic
inactivity. These are listed in Table 2.1 according to the frequency with which they
occurred in the sample. The most common reasons for exit here were linked to obtaining
benefits other than JSA, especially Incapacity Benefit and Income Support. The only
other exit to economic inactivity of any size was ‘transfer to government training’.6
The final combined category was for those respondents who failed to provide any
information for the JUVOS system regarding their reason for leaving JSA. The different
                                           
6 The classification of these items as denoting ‘economic inactivity’ should not be taken to imply complete
detachment from the labour market. It is known that clients undertaking government training often search
for work at the same time, as can those receiving benefits other than JSA. It is likely to suggest a greater
proportion of respondents in economic inactivity than is indicated through surveys, therefore, which often
ask respondents directly whether they are looking for work. What these items have in common, however, is
that the respondents are not in work and, unlike JSA claimants, are not required to be actively seeking
work.
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types of unknown destination are again listed in order of frequency in Table 2.1, with
‘failed to attend’, ‘other reason’ and ‘ceased claiming’ being most common.
Table 2.2 shows the proportion of the sample that was in each of the combined categories
as of December 2000 and shows how this differed between those in Pilot and those in
comparison areas.7
Table 2.2 JUVOS reason for claim end (combined categories), at December 2000
Column %s
Reason Pilot Comparison
Still claiming 42 50
Left for unsubsidised employment 25 21
Left for subsidised employment 2 2
Left for economic inactivity 21 21
Left for unknown destination 11 6
Weighted base 1193 808
It is clear from Table 2.2 that the Pilot sample appeared to outperform the comparison
sample in relation to the proportion of each group that was still claiming JSA in
December 2000, at the end of the evaluation period. Whereas half the comparison sample
were claiming JSA at this point, this was true of only two-fifths of the Pilot sample (42
per cent). What is less clear, however, is whether the Pilot sample outperformed the
comparison sample in relation to desirable reasons for leaving JSA. There is a gap
between the samples in the proportion whose most recent exit from JSA by December
2000 was for unsubsidised employment but it is not large: 25 per cent in the Pilot sample
against 21 per cent of the comparison sample. A larger difference exists regarding exits to
unknown destinations, with 11 per cent of the Pilot sample failing to provide information
as to why they left JSA, compared to only six per cent of the comparison sample. There
were no differences between the samples in relation to the other two categories.
These descriptive statistics imply that, by the end of the evaluation period, respondents
who had experienced Pilot provision were less likely to be on JSA than the comparison
sample and somewhat more likely to have left it for unsubsidised employment, but that
quite a large proportion of the difference in JSA exit rates between the two groups
seemed to be accounted for by exists to unknown destinations. In order to test whether
these conclusions are sustainable however, it is necessary to examine the mean
differences in outcomes that were recorded once the Pilot sample had been matched with
                                           
7 Many leavers to unknown destinations have in fact found work, so that employment effects calculated on
the basis of JUVOS data may be lower bound estimates. Recent research on entrants to New Deal for
Young People has suggested that about 57 per cent of those leaving for unknown destinations had entered
employment (O’Donnell, 2001). Comparisons between JUVOS and stage 2 survey data also suggest that a
substantial proportion of those with unknown destinations had found work. Of those respondents whose last
exit from JSA by December 2000 was to an unknown destination, 36 per cent said they were in work at the
time of the stage 2 survey (which took place in the August-November 2000 period).
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comparators using the matching technique described in Chapter One. The results of this
exercise are reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 JSA exits by December 2000 – programme effects based on matching






Left JSA 8.4 (5%) 100
       Left for unsubsidised employment 2.5 (n.s.) 30
       Left for subsidised employment 0.4 (n.s.) 5
       Left for economic inactivity 1.7 (n.s.) 20
       Left for unknown destination 3.8 (5%) 45
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
The findings reported in Table 2.3 are broadly consistent with the descriptive statistics
presented in Table 2.2. The proportion of the Pilot sample that had left JSA by December
2000 was 8.4 percentage points greater than it would have been had they not received
Pilot provision. This Pilot effect was significant at the 5 per cent level. There was no
evidence, however, that Pilot provision had increased the likelihood of respondents
exiting JSA for employment at this point. The only statistically significant reason for JSA
exit was to unknown destinations. This type of exit accounted for 45 per cent of the
difference in unemployment rates between the two samples (Table 2.3).
The findings in Table 2.3 relate to differences between the Pilot and comparison samples
that were observed at a particular point in time, December 2000. It is clearly important to
estimate sample differences in outcomes that are observed at the end of the evaluation
period because this allows the maximum possible time for the programme to have an
effect and effects estimated at this time have the best chance of being sustainable. As was
noted in Chapter One, however, the services made available to the comparison sample
changed substantially over the course of the comparison sample. In particular, once
members of the comparison sample passed the two years unemployment threshold they
became eligible for national ND25+ provision. Also, from April 2000 national ND25+
provision began to incorporate many of the features of Pilot provision. For these reasons,
a better estimate of the Pilot effect relative to ‘no treatment’ can perhaps be derived by
concentrating on earlier segments of the evaluation period, even though this allows the
programme less time to have an effect.  Table 2.4 shows the proportion of the sample that
was in each of the combined categories as of December 1999 and shows how this differed
between those in Pilot and those in comparison areas.
Table 2.4 JUVOS reason for claim end (combined categories), at December 1999
Column percentages
Reason Pilot Comparison
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Still claiming 53 65
Left for unsubsidised employment 20 12
Left for subsidised employment 3 2
Left for economic inactivity 16 17
Left for unknown destination 8 5
Weighted base 1193 808
Despite having a shorter time period in which to influence outcomes, Pilot provision
appears more effective on the basis of JSA status at December 1999 than it did a year
later. There is a 12 percentage point gap between the samples in relation to the proportion
of respondents still on JSA at the end of December 1999, with just over half of the Pilot
sample (53 percent) having this status compared with two-thirds (65 per cent) of the
comparison sample. This compares to only eight percentage points at the end of
December 2000. Similarly, the Pilot sample enjoyed an eight percentage point advantage
over the comparison sample with regards to exits to unsubsidised employment at
December 1999 (20 per cent against 12 per cent), compared with a four percentage point
advantage at December 2000. Overall, therefore, the descriptive statistics suggests that
the Pilot sample was able to achieve a greater advantage over the comparison sample by
December 1999 than it held at December 2000. The results in Table 2.5 show this
superior performance was confirmed by matching analyses that estimated Pilot effects to
the end of December 1999.
Table 2.5 JSA exits by December 1999 – programme effects based on matching






Left JSA 15.2 (1%) 100
       Left for unsubsidised employment 10.8 (1%) 71
       Left for subsidised employment 1.0 (n.s.) 7
       Left for economic inactivity -0.2 (n.s.) -1
       Left for unknown destination 3.6 (5%) 24
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
The Pilot effects reported for December 1999 are larger than those for December 2000.
Members of the Pilot sample had left JSA by December 1999 to an extent that was 15.2
percentage points greater than it would have been had they not received Pilot provision,
an effect that was significant at the 1 per cent level. Another marked difference between
the two sets of results is that this positive Pilot effect for 1999 was due largely to exits to
unsubsidised employment. Pilot respondents were 10.8 percentage points more likely
than their matches from the comparison sample to have left JSA for unsubsidised
employment, an effect accounting for 71 per cent of the difference in unemployment rates
between the two samples. Exits to unknown destinations were more common for the Pilot
than the comparison sample by December 1999 as they had been by December 2000, but
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the difference in the case of 1999 is that they do not account for as high a proportion of
the JSA exit effect (Table 2.5).
The evidence of a stronger Pilot effect on unemployment exit and employment entry by
the mid-point of the evaluation period than at its end has a number of potential
explanations. It may be that the Pilots only exerted a temporary positive effect on labour
market outcomes, which was evident by the end of 1999 but had atrophied by the end of
the evaluation period. The descriptive statistics do not support this explanation however.
A smaller proportion of Pilot respondents were on JSA in December 2000 (42 per cent)
than in December 1999 (53 per cent) and a greater proportion had left JSA for
unsubsidised employment (25 per cent against 21 per cent).  An alternative explanation is
that the New Deal provision experienced by many members of the comparison sample in
2000 was able to partly close the gap between the Pilot and comparison samples in terms
of labour market outcomes that was observed in 1999. Further analyses are able to shed
more light on the veracity of this explanation.
Table 2.6 reports mean differences in outcomes, based on matching, where JSA exits are
observed up to the end of June 1999. This compares outcomes at a very early stage of the
evaluation period. By the end of June 1999, those members of the comparison sample
who had remained on JSA and had passed two years unemployment were beginning to
receive national New Deal provision but would have been at the very early stages of the
programme. The Pilot sample, in contrast, had all entered New Deal and would, in most
cases, have been at an advanced stage of Gateway provision or would have progressed to
the IAP, assuming that they had not left JSA by this point. This first quarter of the
evaluation period, therefore, approximates most closely to a ‘treatment versus no
treatment’ evaluation scenario.   
Table 2.6 JSA exits by June 1999 – programme effects based on matching






Left JSA 14.9 (1%) 100
       Left for unsubsidised employment 10.1 (1%) 68
       Left for subsidised employment 1.6 (5%) 11
       Left for economic inactivity 1.7 (n.s.) 11
       Left for unknown destination 1.4 (n.s.) 9
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
The findings reported in Table 2.6 show that the robust Pilot effects on unemployment
exit and employment entry, evident by the end of 1999, were indeed apparent by half way
through that year, only six months into the evaluation period. By this stage, members of
the Pilot sample were already 14.9 percentage points more likely to have left JSA than if
they had not received Pilot provision. This is only marginally smaller than the JSA exit
effect observed at the end of 1999. The great majority of this advantage was again due to
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exits to unsubsidised employment, which accounted for over two-thirds (68 per cent) of
the difference in JSA exit rates. One difference between these findings and those reported
for the end of 1999 in Table 2.5 is that there is evidence at the six-month stage of a Pilot
advantage in exits to subsidised employment. While very small at 1.6 percentage points,
this advantage is statistically significant. It reflects the fact that, during the first quarter of
the evaluation period, some members of the Pilot sample would have gained access to the
Employer Subsidy, whereas very few of members of the comparison sample would have
done so.8 It further illustrates how the first quarter of the evaluation period approximates
well to a ‘treatment versus no treatment’ evaluation.
Further insights into the way in which Pilot participation affected outcomes can be
gathered by estimating programme effects at the three-quarter point of the evaluation
period, at the end of June 2000. These are shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7 JSA exits by June 2000 – programme effects based on matching






Left JSA 7.8 (5%) 100
       Left for unsubsidised employment 4.3 (10%) 55
       Left for subsidised employment 0.2 (n.s.) 3
       Left for economic inactivity 0.5 (n.s.) 6
       Left for unknown destination 2.8 (n.s.) 36
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Comparing the Pilot effect on JSA exits by June 2000 with the same outcome by
December 1999 shows how the Pilot effect weakened substantially in the first
half of 2000. Whereas by December 1999 the Pilot sample had left JSA to an
extent that was 15.2 percentage points greater than it would have been had they
not received Pilot provision (Table 2.5), this figure had fallen to 7.8 per cent by
June 2000 (Table 2.7). Similarly, the Pilot effect on exits to unsubsidised
employment had fallen to 4.3 percentage points by June 2000, from its level of
10.8 percentage points at December 1999. It was clearly starting the downward
trend that concluded with its disappearance by the end of the evaluation period,
in December 2000. The most likely explanation for the narrowing of the Pilot
advantage in the third quarter of the evaluation period is that almost all of those
members of the comparison sample who were to enter New Deal during the
evaluation period had done so by this time. Indeed, most of them had acquired
                                           
8 The number of sample members who obtained access to subsidised employment was very low, with only
75 respondents (four per cent) doing so at any stage of the evaluation period. Of the 50 Pilot participants
who received the opportunity however, 31 (62 per cent) did so before the end of June 1999. This was true
for only six (24 per cent) of the comparison sample members who gained access to the subsidy. It is this
dichotomy in the timing of entry to subsidised employment that allows the subsidised employment effect to
be statistically significance despite being very small.
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substantial New Deal experience by this point. This equivalising of New Deal
experience seems to coincide with an equivalising of outcomes as the evaluation
period progresses.
Table 2.8 attempts to draw together the findings in this section by summarising
the Pilot effects estimated at different stages of the evaluation period.
Table 2.8 JSA exits during the evaluation period – summary of results based
on matching




Left JSA 14.9 (1%) 15.2 (1%) 7.8 (5%) 8.4 (5%)
Unsubsidised
employment
10.1 (1%) 10.8 (1%) 4.3 (10%) 2.5 (n.s.)
Subsidised
employment
1.6 (5%) 1.0 (n.s.) 0.2 (n.s.) 0.4 (n.s.)
Economic
inactivity
1.7 (n.s.) -0.2 (n.s.) 0.5 (n.s.) 1.7 (n.s.)
Unknown
destination
1.4 (n.s.) 3.6 (5%) 2.8 (n.s.) 3.8 (5%)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
In terms of the Pilot effect on JSA exit, a distinction can be drawn between the first and
second years of the evaluation period. Pilot provision quickly has a substantial impact on
the likelihood of leaving JSA, with the Pilot sample being almost 15 percentage points
more likely than their comparators to exit JSA by mid-1999. This Pilot effect is
maintained for the remainder of 1999. By mid-2000 there has been a substantial erosion
of the Pilot effect on JSA exit, with the estimate by this time down to about 8 percentage
points, a level broadly maintained until the end of the evaluation period.  This reduction
in the relative performance of the Pilot sample coincides with greater amounts of New
Deal provision amongst many members of the comparison sample.
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The Pilot impact on exits from JSA to employment exhibits a similar pattern, with Pilot
provision adding more than 10 percentage points to the likelihood of leaving JSA for
unsubsidised employment within the first quarter of the evaluation period and this being
maintained until the end of 1999. The effect is more than halved by the third quarter of
the period and is only significant at the 10 per cent level. By the end of 2000 it is below
three percentage points and no longer statistically reliable.
Other JSA exits offer less emphatic findings. There is no evidence of a Pilot effect on
exits to economic inactivity, which consists largely of transfers onto other benefits. There
is early evidence of a Pilot effect on exits to subsidised employment but this is largely a
reflection of programme design rather than programme performance. There is some
evidence of a Pilot effect on exits to unknown destinations. This is by its nature very
difficult to interpret and in any case only statistically significant in two of the quarters.
2.3 Pilot effects on time in unemployment
The previous section estimated Pilot effects on the likelihood of leaving JSA for a variety
of destinations by considering JSA status at several points in time during the evaluation
period. While providing a detailed picture of the pattern of JSA exit, this ‘snapshot’
approach suffers from the limitation that the destination to which a respondent left JSA
during a particular month might be short-lived, and followed by a return to JSA shortly
after. For example, a respondent who left JSA for unsubsidised employment in March
1999 and who had not returned to JSA by June 1999 would be recorded in the first
quarter analyses as having left JSA for unsubsidised employment. If they returned to JSA
in August 1999 but then left for unsubsidised employment again in October 1999, they
would once more be treated in the second quarter analyses as having left JSA for
unsubsidised employment. In this example, the snapshot analyses would tend to
underestimate the respondent’s tendency to be on JSA. Similarly, the person who has
been employed continuously after leaving the Pilots but who claimed JSA for the month
of December 2000 will be recorded as being on JSA. In this example, the snapshot
analysis would overestimate the respondent’s tendency to be on JSA.
This limitation can be overcome by analysing the proportion of time respondents spent on
JSA during all or particular parts of the evaluation period. Table 2.9 presents descriptive
statistics on this outcome variable.
Table 2.9 Proportion of time on JSA
Time period Pilot (%) Comparison (%) Pilot-Comparison
1999 and 2000 57 69 -12
1999 67 80 -13
2000 47 57 -10
First quarter 80 91 -11
Second quarter 54 69 -15
Third quarter 49 59 -10
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Fourth quarter 44 54 -10
Weighted base 1133 756
For the evaluation period as a whole, Pilot participants spent, on average, 57 per
cent of the time on JSA, whereas members of the comparison sample spent 69
per cent, a difference of 12 percentage points. The difference in 1999 was larger
than in 2000, at 13 percentage points as against 10. This distinction is consistent
with the findings presented earlier on JSA exits, which showed that the overall
advantage of Pilot participants had more to do with events in 1999 than in 2000.
Another similarity becomes apparent when the proportion of time on JSA in each
of the four quarters of the evaluation period is examined. The greater relative
performance of the Pilots in 1999 is particularly apparent from the second
quarter of the evaluation period, July to December, where they enjoy a 15
percentage point advantage over the comparison sample. This is again
consistent with the findings on JSA exits, which showed the Pilot effect to be
strongest at the end of this quarter.
Table 2.9 also illustrates how the incidence of unemployment diminished for both
samples over the course of the evaluation period. Whereas Pilot participants
spent an average of 80 per cent of their time on JSA in the first quarter, this fell
to 44 per cent by the fourth quarter. The comparison sample experienced a
similar decline, from 91 per cent in the first quarter to 54 per cent by the fourth.
These descriptive statistics are consistent with the idea that the diminution of the
Pilot advantage over time had more to do with a ‘catch-up’ effect by the
comparison sample rather than atrophy of the Pilot impact.
A reliable indicator of the Pilot advantage in relation to proportion of time on JSA
can only be obtained by comparing mean differences between the Pilot sample
and the comparators with whom they were paired by the matching process. The
results based on matching analyses of this outcome variable are shown in Table
2.10.
Table 2.10 Proportion of time on JSA – programme effects based on matching
Time period Pilot effect
1999 and 2000 -10.8 (1%)
1999 -13.1 (1%)
2000 -8.3 (5%)
First quarter -11.0 (1%)
Second quarter -15.2 (1%)
Third quarter -10.2 (1%)
Fourth quarter -6.3 (10%)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
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The programme effect for the evaluation period as a whole suggests that Pilot
participation makes the proportion of time on JSA 10.8 percentage points lower
than it would have been in the absence of Pilot provision. The effect for 1999
(13.1 percentage points) is again larger than for 2000 (8.3 percentage points).
Examination of the four quarters again shows the second quarter to be the
strongest in terms of the Pilots relative performance (15.2 percentage points). In
a finding somewhat inconsistent with the descriptive statistics and the estimates
on JSA exits, the Pilot effect for the fourth quarter is much reduced, at only 6.3
percentage points and on the margins of statistical reliability. This implies that
the Pilot effect on time on JSA might not last much beyond 2000.
2.4 Pilot effects on employment entry and time in employment
The results reported thus far in this chapter have used outcome data derived
from JUVOS. In this section, attention is focused on findings from the stage 2
survey, carried out between August and November 2000. Using data from the
stage 2 survey makes it possible to estimate programme impacts on employment
at the time of the interview and on the proportion of time in employment during
the evaluation period. Table 2.11 presents descriptive statistics on these
outcome variables.
Table 2.11 Employment entry and time in employment – descriptive statistics
Measure of employment Pilot Comparison Weighted
base
In employment at stage 2 interview 29 % 25 % 2001
Proportion of time in employment
during evaluation period
22 % 18 % 1962
The descriptive statistics on employment at the stage 2 interview are broadly
consistent with those for exits to employment by December 2000 (reported in
Table 2.2). Whereas 27 per cent of the Pilot sample and 23 per cent of the
comparison sample had left JSA for employment in their most recent JSA exit up
to December 2000, 29 per cent of the Pilot sample reported being in employment
at the stage 2 interview compared with 25 per cent of the comparison sample. As
the stage 2 interview took place in October 2000, on average, this similarity is to
be expected. It suggests a small Pilot advantage at the time of the stage 2
interview. The data on proportion of time employed during the evaluation period
presents a similar picture, with Pilot respondents having spent an average of 22
per cent of the time in employment, compared with 18 per cent of the
comparison sample. Reliable indicators of the Pilot advantage in relation to being
in employment at the stage 2 interview and proportion of time in employment can
of course only be obtained by comparing mean differences between the Pilot
sample and the comparators with whom they were paired by the matching
process. Table 2.12 presents the results of these analyses.
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Table 2.12 Employment entry and time in employment – programme effects
based on matching
Measure of employment Pilot effect
In employment at stage 2 interview -3.8 (n.s.)
Proportion of time in employment during evaluation
period
3.5 (n.s.)
The matching analyses based on outcome variables from the survey data
provide no evidence that Pilot participation has increased the chances of
obtaining and remaining in work. The Pilot sample are no more likely to be in
work than the comparison sample and, although they enjoyed 3.5 percentage
points more time in employment during the evaluation period, this effect was not
statistically significant.
While the non-significance of the ‘in employment at stage 2 interview’ variable is
to be expected given the similar results from analysis of JUVOS exits to
employment by December 2000, it is rather surprising that there is no significant
Pilot effect on proportion of time in employment during the evaluation period.
Part of the reason for this non-significance is that, while Pilot entrants were more
likely than the comparison sample to enter work during the evaluation period,
they were no more likely to stay in work having done so. Thus, while 36 per cent
of the Pilot sample entered work at some stage of the evaluation period, against
30 per cent of the comparison group, those respondents who entered work spent
an average of 60 per cent of the evaluation period in employment, regardless of
the sample they were in. All of the advantage, therefore, enjoyed by the Pilot
sample over the comparison group in relation to the proportion of time in
employment, shown in Table 2.11, is due to their greater tendency to enter
employment rather than to continue in it, and their higher rate of employment is
not large enough to produce a significant effect.
2.5 The relative effects of the Gateway and Intensive Activity Period
The preceding sections of this chapter have established the existence of a
robust Pilot effect on exits from JSA and time off JSA and some evidence of a
Pilot effect on exits from JSA to unsubsidised employment, especially during the
first half of the evaluation period. It is of interest to investigate the extent to which
this is due to different components of ND25+ Pilot provision. In this section, an
attempt is made to estimate the separate impact of the Gateway and Intensive
Activity Period (IAP).
Attempting to provide separate programme effects for those Pilot participants
who only experienced the Gateway and those who progressed to the IAP is a
difficult task. The main reason for this is that only experiencing the Gateway or
progressing to the IAP is partly determined by a respondent’s success or failure
regarding labour market outcomes during the evaluation period. For example,
Pilot respondents who only experienced the Gateway would have done so
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because they left JSA before they were required to enter the IAP. Conversely,
those Pilot respondents who entered the IAP did so because they had failed to
leave JSA before the end of the Gateway period. When selecting comparators
for these two groups, it is obviously important to choose from a pool of
respondents with similar experiences regarding JSA exit during the evaluation
period, or else the comparison will be invalid. This was not an issue for the
estimation of overall Pilot effects because the selection criteria were all
determined prior to the evaluation period. Separating Gateway and IAP effects is
also difficult because some of the Gateway’s impact is likely to be attributable to
the existence of and deterrent effects of the IAP.
Estimating separate effects proved easier for the IAP than the Gateway, for
reasons that will be explained below. Overall, 517 Pilot respondents (43 per
cent) entered the IAP at some stage during the evaluation period. Of these 517
respondents, 367 (71 per cent) entered the IAP before end of June 1999 and
334 (65 per cent) were still on JSA at the end of June 1999. Finding acceptable
comparators for this group of 334 IAP entrants was thus relatively
straightforward, since any comparison sample respondent who was on JSA at
the end of June 1999 would be eligible. After selecting matches from the 646 (80
per cent) of comparison sample members who fulfilled this criteria, the impact of
the IAP was assessed by examining outcomes in the last three-quarters of the
evaluation period. Seeking comparators for the other 183 Pilot respondents who
entered the IAP was considered problematic since they were either in work by
the end of June 1999 or entered the IAP after June 1999, so finding comparators
in a similar position would have been very difficult. Concentrating on respondents
who entered the IAP in the first quarter of the evaluation period has the added
advantage that these respondents were experiencing the programme in a
manner consistent with its design, in that they had been through the Gateway
and entered the IAP within about six months of New Deal entry, whereas many
of those who entered the IAP at a later stage would have been respondents with
a delayed Gateway entry or a long Gateway.
Matches were found for the selected group of IAP respondents by re-running the
Pilot entry model based only on themselves and those members of the
comparison sample who were on JSA at the end of June 1999. It was then
possible to estimate mean differences between the two groups in relation to JSA
exits. Table 2.13 contains the results of this exercise.
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Table 2.13 JSA exits during the evaluation period – results for IAP entrants
and
their comparators, based on matching




Left JSA - 4.8 (n.s.) 7.9 (10%) 9.5 (10%)
Unsubsidised
employment
- 6.3 (10%) 7.3 (5%) 6.3 (10%)
Subsidised
employment
- 0.3 (n.s.) -1.0 (n.s.) -1.0 (n.s)
Economic
inactivity
- -2.5 (n.s.) 1.0 (n.s) 2.5 (n.s.)
Unknown
destination
- 0.6 (n.s.) 0.6 (n.s.) 1.6 (n.s.)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
The results in Table 2.13 provide interesting insights into the effect of IAP on
JSA exits. There are of course no results up to the end of June 1999 because all
members of the Pilot and comparison samples used in these analyses were still
on JSA at this point. Thereafter, some evidence of a JSA effect starts to emerge,
particularly regarding exits to unsubsidised employment. IAP entrants have a 6.3
percentage point advantage over their comparators with regard to unsubsidised
employment exits by December 1999 and this effect strengthens to 7.3
percentage points by June 2000. Despite dropping back to 6.3 percentage points
by the end of the evaluation period it remains statistically significant, albeit only
at the 10 per cent confidence level.
There is also evidence of an IAP effect on exits from JSA to any destination.
These take rather longer to emerge, with no sign of them until the second half of
the evaluation period, but reach 7.9 percentage points by June 2000, before
rising to 9.5 percentage points by December 2000. These estimates are again
not particularly well specified, with significance levels not rising above 10 per
cent, but they do provide evidence of an IAP effect. An interesting point to note is
that the pattern of Pilot effects for IAP entrants is the reverse of that for the
sample as a whole, with effects emerging most strongly in 2000 and being
maintained until the end of the evaluation period. This is partly because the IAP
entrants are receiving Pilot provision over a longer period of time than Pilot
entrants as a whole so there is likely to be more of a lag before the treatment
shows its effect. It may also suggest, however, that the more substantial
provision embodied in the IAP is able to produce positive effects that are more
sustainable than those attributable solely to the Gateway.9
                                           
9 The baseline report on ND25+ Pilot provision (Lissenburgh, 2000) provides a detailed account of what
Pilot participants receive as part of the IAP.
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Programme effects based on matching were also calculated for those 676 Pilot
participants (57 per cent) who had only experienced the Gateway. As the
Gateway was available to all Pilot entrants and they started leaving JSA from the
very beginning of the evaluation period, it did not prove possible to exclude any
members of the comparison sample from the group of potential comparators for
these respondents. A re-matching exercise was carried out, therefore, with
matches for the Gateway-only Pilot entrants drawn from the comparison sample
as a whole. Estimates of mean differences between the Pilot and comparison
samples based on these groups are likely to overstate the impact of Gateway,
since those Pilot respondents who experienced Gateway only have, by definition,
achieved sufficient success in terms of labour market outcomes to avoid entering
the IAP.10 By selecting matches who are as close to the participants as possible
in terms of the factors associated with experiencing Gateway only however, this
problem should kept to a minimum. Table 2.14 shows the results of matching
analyses based on these groups.
Table 2.14 JSA exits during the evaluation period – results for Gateway only
entrants and their comparators, based on matching




Left JSA 31.5 (1%) 20.0 (1%) 15.3 (5%) 10.5 (5%)
Unsubsidised
employment
15.4 (1%) 13.3 (1%) 9.3 (5%) 5.5 (n.s.)
Subsidised
employment
1.6 (n.s.) -0.7 (n.s.) -0.6 (n.s.) 0.1 (n.s.)
Economic
inactivity
8.4 (10%) 1.0 (n.s.) -0.3 (n.s.) -1.3 (n.s.)
Unknown
destination
6.0 (1%) 6.3 (5%) 6.9 (5%) 6.1 (5%)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
For the reasons stated above, the Pilot effects presented in Table 2.14 are likely
to overstate the size of Gateway only effects, but there is perhaps more interest
in any case in the pattern of effects rather than their size. There is evidence of a
large Gateway effect during the first quarter of the evaluation period, with
Gateway only entrants leaving JSA to an extent that is 31.5 percentage points
greater than their comparators. About half of this effect is due to exits for
unsubsidised employment, but exits to economic inactivity and unknown
destinations account for almost all of the other half. This is consistent with an
early ‘shakeout’ effect from the Gateway, with substantial numbers moving onto
                                           
10 It is important to note, however, that by no means all Pilot respondents who did not enter the IAP had
achieved what one would have expected in relation to JSA exits. Eight per cent of them, for example, were
on JSA throughout the evaluation period and 14 per cent were on JSA for at least 90 per cent of the
evaluation period.
ND25+ Pilots: quantitative evaluation using stage 2 survey
xxx
other benefits (most commonly Incapacity Benefits). The first and second
quarters are also those in which one would expect to see most evidence of
participants leaving the Gateway in order to avoid entering the IAP and, indeed,
the size of the Pilot effect are much larger in the first half of the evaluation period
than in the second half.
Whereas the pattern of IAP effects tended to run counter to that of overall Pilot
effects, the Gateway only effects tend to amplify them. Thus, the effect on JSA
exits falls steeply in 2000 and by the last quarter is only marginally higher at 10.5
percentage points than the advantage achieved by the IAP entrants over their
comparators (9.5 percentage points). Gateway effects on exits to unsubsidised
employment actually become non-significant by the end of the evaluation period,
whereas they remained significant for IAP entrants.
The size of the Gateway only effects, notwithstanding their likely exaggeration in
these analyses, and the fact that most Pilot entrants only experienced the
Gateway, means it is almost certainly the case that most of the overall Pilot
effect is attributable to the Gateway. However, experience of Gateway only
appears largely responsible for the withering of the Pilot effect in the second half
of the evaluation period, in the sense that members of the Pilot sample who
experienced Gateway only were most susceptible to being ‘caught up’ by their
comparators. IAP effect, while smaller, appeared more sustained and are
perhaps more likely to persist for some time after the evaluation period. These
findings, along with the realisation that part of the Gateway effect is almost
certainly due to the presence of the IAP and some participants’ desire to avoid it,
suggest that both of the mandatory elements of Pilot provision have an important
role in generating positive Pilot effects on employment entry and unemployment
exit. The next section moves on to consider the impact of New Deal
opportunities.
2.6 The impact of New Deal opportunities
Once ND25+ participants have passed through the Gateway or Advisory Interview
Process, there may be the chance to undertake one of a number of activities, or
opportunities, designed to help them into work. This is the case in both Pilot and national
areas. This section investigates whether undertaking any of these opportunities increased
participants’ chances of leaving JSA and entering work.
The focus is on three types of opportunity: Employer Subsidy, Education and
Training Opportunities (ETO) and Work Based Learning for Adults (WBLA).
The number of sample members who experienced these opportunities was too
low to assess their impact through matching. Table 2.15 shows the proportion of
each sample who experienced a New Deal opportunity at some stage during the
evaluation period.
Table 2.15 The experience of New Deal opportunities – descriptive statistics









ETO 1 4 2
WBLA 8 5 7
None 87 89 88
Weighted base 1193 808 2001
About one in eight respondents (13 per cent) experienced an opportunity, the
most common of which was WBLA, which was undertaken by seven per cent of
respondents. A further four per cent gained access to Employer Subsidy while
only two per cent undertook an Education and Training Opportunity. There was
little difference between Pilot and comparison areas in take up of Employer
Subsidies, but WBLA was somewhat more common in Pilot areas while ETO
was a little more prevalent elsewhere (Table 2.15).
In order to analyse whether these opportunities affected respondents’ labour
market outcomes, it was necessary to restrict attention to those opportunities
that began in 1999. Without doing this, the analyses would be likely to produce
spurious results, since each of the opportunities is designed to last several
months and enough time must remain in the evaluation period for them to
encourage positive labour market outcomes. This did not cause a substantial
decline in sample numbers since around three-quarters of opportunities
undertaken begin in 1999.
As an alternative to matching, regression models were ran that had labour
market outcomes as their dependent variables and that used the factors
employed for the matching analyses as explanatory variables (see Table 1.2 for
reference). To this list of variables were added indicators of whether the
respondent had undertaken subsidised employment, ETO or WBLA in 1999.
Analyses of New Deal opportunities were restricted to 1999 entrants because
respondents who entered these opportunities in 2000 would have had too little
time in which to register successful outcomes and indeed may still have been
undertaking the opportunity at the end of the evaluation period. Table 2.16
presents the main results obtained from this modelling exercise.















2.48 (1%) 1.72 (10%) -15.8 (1%)
ETO 0.41 (n.s.) 0.83 (n.s.) 16.2 (5%)
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WBLA 0.50 (5%) 0.67 (n.s.) 5.9 (n.s.)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Binary logistic regression models were run to estimate the impact of New Deal
opportunities on the likelihood of being in employment at the time of the stage 2
interview.11 Those respondents who had gained access to an Employer Subsidy
in 1999 were 2.48 times more likely to be in employment in August-November
2000 than respondents who had not undertaken this opportunity, after controlling
for other factors that affect employment entry probabilities.12 Given the gap
between the end of 1999 and the stage 2 interview, the jobs held by Employer
Subsidy entrants at the stage 2 interview must have been unsubsidised. WBLA
had the opposite effect on employment, with WBLA entrants being only half as
likely (0.50) to be in work in August-November 2000 than a respondent who did
not undertake this opportunity. As any WBLA spell that started in 1999 should
have been complete by the time of the stage 2 interview, this negative effect on
job entry cannot be due to entrants still being on the programme.
Binary logistic regression models estimating the impact of New Deal
opportunities on the likelihood of being off JSA in December 2000 tell a similar
story. Employer Subsidy entrants were almost twice as likely to be off JSA than
those who did not get the subsidy, but the other opportunities had no effect.
Finally, Ordinary Least Squares regression models were run to investigate
whether opportunity entry in 1999 influenced the proportion of time on JSA in
2000. Employer Subsidy entrants reduced their time on JSA by about 16
percentage points, whereas those on ETO increased it by a similar amount. This
may be due, however, to their still being on the opportunity because, unlike the
other opportunities, entering ETO does not involve signing off JSA.
In common with similar analyses carried out as part of the evaluation of ND25+
in national areas (Lissenburgh, 2001), these findings suggest that subsidised
employment had a positive impact whereas ETO and WBLA had a negative or
no impact.13
                                           
11 More detail on logistic regression models and how they should be interpreted can be found in Payne,
Payne, Lissenburgh and Range (1999).
12 While the models controlled for other factors affecting job entry, it did not prove possible to control for
selection into the opportunities, as the probit models used to do this within a Heckman (1979) two-step
framework did not have sufficient explanatory power.
13 While consistent with analyses of WBLA carried out as part of other New Deal evaluations, these results
do not sit comfortably with the findings of more detailed evaluations of WBLA’s predecessor, Training for
Work (TfW). Payne, Payne, Lissenburgh and Range (1999) for example, found that TfW participants spent
more time in work after the programme than would have been expected had they not entered the
programme. It should be noted, however, that this earlier study was based on participants who left TfW in
1995, about half a decade prior to the findings reported in this study. Also, TfW’s relative importance
among UK active labour market programmes was much greater in the pre-New Deal era than is that of
WBLA today. This makes any direct comparison of the two studies very difficult.
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2.7 The variation in Pilot effects by area
Pilot effects in 12 months entry and 18 months entry areas
The penultimate section of this chapter investigates whether the impact of Pilot
provision varied according to area type. A particular feature of the Pilot
programme was the testing of whether intervention was more effective at 12
months or 18 months. Some Pilot areas allowed clients to enter after 12 months
unemployment, while others did so after 18 months. In order to test the relative
effectiveness of these two timings of intervention, a re-matching exercise was
carried out in which Pilot respondents from 12 month areas were matched with
comparators from the areas that were matched specifically to 12 month Pilot
areas, while those from 18 month areas were matched with comparators from
the areas that were matched specifically to these Pilot areas. Table 2.17
contains the results of this exercise.
Table 2.17 Pilot effects by area type – analyses based on matching
Pilot area type Pilot effect on
proportion of time











on JSA in 2000
(percentage
points)
12 month entry -8.6 (5%) -9.8 (1%)        -7.4 (n.s.)
18 month entry -6.2 (5%) -8.9 (1%) - 3.3 (n.s)
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Table 2.17 shows that both 12 and 18 month entry areas reduced the proportion of time
participants spent on JSA in the evaluation period as whole and in 1999, but not in 2000.
The positive effects in 12 month areas appear larger than those in 18 month areas but the
differences are not great. This suggests Pilot provision has been effective in both area
types but does not indicate that intervention at 12 months is more effective than at 18
months, or vice-versa.
This result is somewhat surprising given that internal ES monitoring of JUVOS data has
consistently shown that 18 month intervention is more effective than at 12 months in
terms of off-flows from JSA. The finding of no significant differences between 12 and 18
month intervention in this research might stem from the fact that people in the 18 month
comparison group became eligible for national New Deal provision sooner than those in
the 12 month comparison group, thus reducing the 18 month effect.
Variations in performance among Pilot areas
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The ND25+ Pilots baseline report (Lissenburgh, 2000) suggested that, as of June 2000,
there were considerable differences between the 26 Pilot areas in terms of job entry rates.
Table 2.18 investigates whether this was still the case in December 2000.
Table 2.18 Variations in Pilot performance by area, in terms of JSA status in
December 2000 – descriptive statistics
Column percentages
JSA status Top 6 Middle 14 Bottom 6 All
















12 10 12 11
Weighted base 202 702 289 1193
This table defines Pilot areas as being in the Top 6, Middle 14 or Bottom 6
according to the proportion of entrants who had left JSA by December 2000. It
then shows the JSA status in December 2000 of entrants in each of these three
performance categories. As was the case in June 2000 as described in the
baseline report, what really distinguishes the high-performing areas is their ability
to encourage participants to leave JSA for work. By December 2000, about four
in 10 participants in Top 6 areas (38 per cent) had left JSA for unsubsidised
employment, compared with a quarter of participants in the Middle 14 and a sixth
(17 per cent) in the Bottom 6. These differences in exits to unsubsidised
employment account for nearly all of the gap between the Top 6 and Middle 14
areas with regard to the proportion of respondents who were still claiming JSA in
December 2000. It is also noticeable that the differences between the Top 6 and
the Middle 14 are greater than those between the Middle 14 and the Bottom 6.
For example, there is a 13 percentage point difference between Top 6 and
Middle 14 areas in relation to the proportion of each group that had left JSA for
unsubsidised employment, but a gap of only eight percentage points between
the Middle 14 and Bottom 6. The differences in proportions of each group who
were still claiming JSA follows a similar pattern. This suggests that performance
variation among ND25+ Pilot areas takes the form of a ‘short neck’ of high
performers rather than a ‘long tail’ of underperformers.
2.8 Conclusion
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This chapter has used matching in the context of a matched comparison group
evaluation design in order to estimate the impact of Pilot provision on
employment entry and unemployment exit. The main results were as follows:-
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants out of
unemployment. This was the case for the evaluation period as a whole and
for 1999 and 2000 considered separately. Effects were found in relation to
both exits from JSA and time off JSA, so that once the programme had
enabled participants to leave unemployment, they tended not to return. The
effects for 1999 were stronger than for 2000 so there was some evidence of
the Pilot effect weakening as the evaluation period progressed.
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants to enter employment
in 1999 but the effect weakened over time and had become non-significant
by 2000. The diminution of the Pilot advantage over the comparison sample
in terms of employment entry, and indeed unemployment exit, could be due
either to the atrophy of Pilot effects or to a ‘catching-up’ process on the part
of the comparison group. The available evidence suggested the latter was
more likely. Pilot respondents had higher employment entry and
unemployment exit levels in 2000 than 1999, but by this year many members
of the comparison group had accumulated substantial experience under the
national ND25+ programme, which after April 2000 was altered to include
some elements of Pilot provision. It is perhaps not surprising that the
weakening of the Pilot advantage coincided with many members of the
comparison sample receiving assistance that resembled Pilot provision.
Attempts were also made to estimate the separate impact of different elements
of Pilot provision, especially the Gateway and Intensive Activity Period (IAP).
This proved particularly difficult in relation to the former, but it was possible to
establish that both had a discernible impact and that the direct effect of the
Gateway was almost certainly larger than that of IAP. The effect of IAP seemed
more sustained, however, and was not weakening at the end of the evaluation
period.
It was also possible to establish that Pilot provision was effective in both 12 month entry
and 18 month entry areas but there was no indication that intervention at 12 months was
more effective than at 18 months, or vice-versa.
Among New Deal opportunities, positive effects were found for Employer
Subsidy but Education and Training Opportunities and Work Based Learning for
Adults had a negative or no impact.
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3. Pilot effects on employability
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers how New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed has
affected the ‘employability’ of its participants.   The introductory section briefly
reviews the concept of employability and discusses its potential importance.  The
second section of the chapter reviews the analysis requirements and introduces
the methods adopted. The next four sections present results under the sub-
headings of  ‘job search behaviour’, ‘attitudes’, ‘human capital acquisition’ and
‘attachment to the labour market’.
The concept of employability
Increasing the employability of participants is an important objective of New Deal
25+. This does not simply mean increasing the proportion that enters jobs in the
short-term. Increased employability is an objective for all participants. It includes
outcomes that are steps towards employment by the participant, or towards the
participant becoming better equipped to compete in the job market long-term.
These most obviously include improvements in job search, and in skills and
qualifications which have a value in the job market. In addition, it includes the
development of attitudes and motivations that are helpful for getting and keeping
a job, such as self-confidence and self-development.
Associated with employability is the notion of ‘distance travelled’ by the
unemployed person towards ‘job readiness’. This recognises, in a realistic way,
that many long-term unemployed people are far from being able to compete in
the job market.  They may need to develop through several stages or steps
before being equipped to compete.  A programme that incorporates the notion of
employability will help the participant to make progress along this path.
An important aspect of the employability concept is its inclusiveness, in the
sense that everyone is intended to gain something from the programme, whether
or not they actually get a job.   Programmes that increase employability for a
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wide range of disadvantaged people can be regarded as a potentially important
way of combating social exclusion.  In principle, it is appropriate to assess their
value in terms of the welfare gains to the participants as well as of the efficiency
gains to the labour market or the economy.
3.2 Assessing Pilot effects on employability
The concept of employability has considerable implications for the evaluation of
labour market programmes. In the past, most evaluations have focused on a
limited range of economic outcomes, notably employment rates and wages. For
an analysis of employability, a wider range of intermediate outcomes must be
considered. The main headings have already been noted: training and
qualifications (or more generally, human capital acquisition), job search and
attitudes and motivation. Although this still does not constitute a comprehensive
picture, it adds up to a considerably wider assessment than has been common in
previous labour market evaluations in Britain.
While improving employability is an objective of the ND25+ programme as a
whole, the chapter concentrates on whether the Pilot sample have achieved this
objective to a greater degree than the comparison sample. The analyses rely
primarily on the matching techniques discussed in previous chapters, although
where sample numbers are not sufficient descriptive statistics are employed.
3.3 Acquiring human capital
One of the likely reasons why many unemployed people have difficulty in
establishing themselves in work is a lack of work experience, skills and
qualifications, or in economic parlance, a deficit of ‘human capital’. This lack of
human capital may continue to be a problem even if an individual enters a job, if
for example it is in a low-skilled occupation with few opportunities for acquiring
transferable skills or qualifications. Conversely, gains in human capital may be
valuable in the medium-term even if an individual does not obtain a job in the
short-term. The job eventually obtained may be of a better quality, the individual
may learn to value and seek further skills and qualifications, and the experience
of gaining a skill or a qualification may itself increase self-confidence or other
facets of motivation which build towards job-readiness.
Work-based training
An important aspect of human capital acquisition is the receipt of work-based
training. Respondents who were in employment at the time of the stage 2
interview were asked whether, since they started the job, they had received any
training to do the work. Overall, a third of respondents said they had received
work-based training  based on this definition. This proportion did not vary
appreciably between the Pilot and comparison groups but in order to estimate
whether Pilot provision had an impact on work-based training, Pilot respondents
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who were in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview were re-matched
with comparators who were also employed at this time. Table 3.1 contains the
results of this analysis.






Work-based training 0.62 (n.s.) 551
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
As the descriptive statistics implied, there was no significant difference between
the Pilot sample and their comparators in terms of their likelihood of receiving
work-based training after entering employment.
Qualifications gained
A potentially important dimension of employability is gain in qualifications, since
this is likely to enhance transferability in the job market. Analysing qualifications
gained is also a good measure of ‘distance travelled’ on the programme.
Respondents were asked about their qualifications at both the stage 1 and stage
2 interviews. Overall, 929 respondents provided information about their
qualifications at both interviews. About one in eight Pilot respondents (12 per
cent) obtained a qualification between the stage 1 and stage 2 interviews, as did
a similar proportion of comparison sample respondents. Re-matching was
carried out on this group of respondents in order to test whether there was a
statistically significant Pilot impact on qualification acquisition. Table 3.2 shows
the results.






Qualifications gained 0.74 (n.s.) 929
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Again, there was no discernible evidence of a Pilot effect on qualifications
gained, with members of the Pilot sample less than one percentage point more
likely than their comparators to obtain a qualification over the course of the
evaluation period.
3.4 Job search behaviour
An individual’s employability depends in part on persistent and effective job
search and this forms part of the assessment of Pilot provision.   Job search
behaviour has many different facets - for example search effort, flexibility, and
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wage expectations - and each of these can be measured in different ways.  It is
not possible to arrive at a single summary measure capturing job search
effectiveness. In addition, many people who already have jobs do not engage in
job search, so many of the questions about job search can only be asked of a
selected sub-sample who are not currently in work.
Wage expectations
Attention was focused on the wages sought by people in the sample who did not
have a job and were seeking one.  The ability of individuals to find jobs depends
in part on the wages they seek and are prepared to accept.  This is referred to as
their ‘wage expectation’. The stage 2 survey asked two questions about wage
expectations, regarding the net pay they were looking for the last time they
searched for jobs and the lowest amount they would have accepted. The latter
question is related to, but not identical with, the economic concept of the
reservation wage. A relatively high wage expectation reduces the range of jobs
that are available to an individual. It should be appreciated, however, that job
seekers often accept job offers that are lower than their stated wage
expectations.  In addition, higher wage expectations might be taken as evidence
that the programme has increased participants’ self-confidence and expectations
from the labour market, so the interpretation of findings on this issue is not
straightforward.
Among those who were unemployed at the stage 2 interview, descriptive
statistics suggested that Pilot participants had higher wage expectations than the
comparison sample, both in relation to the net pay they were looking for, where
they wanted an average of £5.65 per hour against the comparison sample’s
£5.38 and the lowest wage for which they were willing to work, where the Pilot
figures dropped to £4.76 but was still higher than the comparison sample’s
£4.55.
A re-matching procedure was carried out to assess the impact of Pilot provision
on wage expectations. The results are presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Pilot effects on wage expectations - analyses based on matching
Measure of wage
expectations
Pilot effect (£ per hour) Weighted base
Expected wage 0.33 (5%) 982
Minimum wage 0.23 (n.s.) 938
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
It can be seen from this table that Pilot participants expected to earn £0.33 more
per hour than if they had not been through the programme. This effect is
significant at the 5 per cent level. The Pilot sample also had higher expectations
with regard to the minimum wage they would find acceptable, but this difference
was not statistically reliable.
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Number of job search methods used
The next outcome measure, number of search methods, is an indicator of the
intensity of job search14. It is assumed that the more methods people use to find
jobs, the more in touch they will remain with a wide range of opportunities. In
addition, wide search may be indicative of motivation to get a job.
Individuals were asked to state which job methods they had used in the
preceding four weeks, from a list of six (they were also able to state any
additional methods which were not listed).   The average number of methods
used, among those not employed at the stage 2 interview, was 2.61 for the Pilot
group and 2.79 for the comparison sample. A re-matching procedure was carried
out to assess whether Pilot provision had made an impact on search intensity for
those still out of work.  The results are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Pilot effects on number of job search methods used – analysis
based on matching





Number of job search
method used
-0.08 (n.s.) 1450
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Again, there is little evidence of a Pilot effect. In fact, Pilot participants used
slightly fewer job search methods than their comparators but the effect was
much too small to be statistically reliable.
3.5 Self-efficacy
A central position in social-psychological theories of motivation is occupied by
the concept of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). Feelings of capability, developed
through past experience and self-imaging, lead people to attempt goals, and
achievement of goals further develops feelings of capability. A labour market
programme that helps to initiate this virtuous circle may be particularly effective
in developing employability.
To examine this concept, a five-item scale of ‘job search self-efficacy’ was
included in the survey.   The items constituting the scale are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Items measuring job search self-efficacy
                                           
14  Another available measure is the number of job applications made.  This however has two disadvantages.
Job applications are influenced by the vacancies available, and hence to some extent may reflect local
labour market demand as well as individual search effort.   Also, not all respondents can give an exact
number of job applications made, so the data are in banded form, which makes analysis more complicated.
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Aspect of self-efficacy Per cent giving positive responses
I know the best ways to apply for the
kind of work I want
83.6
I know how to write a good
application letter
74.9
I do well at job interviews when I get
them
73.2
I have lots of experience relevant to
work
80.3
I have many work related skills that
would make me a good employee
82.6
Weighted base 2001
These responses indicate relatively high levels of job search self-efficacy on the
part of respondents. The proportion responding positively is higher in each
category than for the young unemployed people asked the same questions as
part of the evaluation of New Deal for Young People (Bonjour, Dorsett, Knight,
Lissenburgh, Mukherjee, Payne, Range, Urwin and White, 2001). This is
particularly the case for the questions on experience and work-related skills,
where one would expect the 25+ age group to have some advantage.
Responses to each item were scored 1-5 with higher scores indicative of greater
confidence in capacity to carry out an aspect of job search. The responses to
each question were added together to form a scale. Mean differences between
the Pilot sample and their comparators were then compared to examine whether
Pilot provision tended to improve participants’ self-efficacy. The results of this
analysis are shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6 Pilot effects on job search self-efficacy - analysis based on
matching








Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
Once more, there is a negligible mean difference between the Pilot and
comparison scores on the self-efficacy scale. While there was evidence overall
therefore of relatively high levels of self-efficacy, Pilot provision did not raise
these above those found in the comparison sample.
3.6 Attachment to the labour market
Attention is turned finally to labour market ‘attachment’. Often referred to as
being ‘economically active’, this is usually defined as either having a job, or
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seeking a job.  Here, the usual definition is extended by also including those who
were continuing on  New Deal at the time of the second survey interview.   In all,
82 per cent of the analysis sample were ‘attached’ on this definition, a proportion
that was higher in the comparison sample (at 85 per cent) than in the Pilot
sample (80 per cent). The usual analysis using matching was carried out and the
results are shown in Table 3.7.








Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
The higher level of labour market attachment on the part of the comparison
sample that was evident from the descriptive statistics persisted after matching,
with the Pilot sample having an estimated level of labour market attachment that
was 2.73 percentage points lower than it would have been had they not received
Pilot provision. This difference was small, however, and did not reach statistical
significance.
3.7 Conclusion
Raising participants’ employability is one of the primary ways in which an active
labour market programme can influence job entry chances beyond the
immediate evaluation period. This is because improving employability implies
developing the skills and capacities likely to increase participants’ labour market
prospects over the medium- to long-term.
This chapter’s analyses of employability have focused primarily, therefore, on
respondents who were not in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview.
These respondents are ones who have found it relatively hard to enter work
during the evaluation period, so analyses of employability are particularly
important for them.
There was very little evidence to suggest that Pilot provision had raised
employability. The only significant effect detected in this chapter’s analyses was
that Pilot entrants had higher wage expectations than their comparators. This is
more likely to reduce their chances of entering work over the medium- to long-
term rather than increase it, because having higher wage expectations reduces
the range of job offers a person is likely to find acceptable. While higher wage
expectations may be evidence of greater self-confidence on the part of Pilot
participants, this conclusion was not supported by the analysis of self-efficacy.
What is perhaps more likely is that the greater effectiveness of Pilot provision
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raised expectations with regard to programme impacts and these encouraged
participants to have higher wage expectations. A paradox of the programme is
that raising expectations in this way might make it harder for those participants
who do not enter employment in the short-term to do so in the medium- to long-
term, because these higher expectations will make the participants less
employable.
4. Pilot effects on job quality
4.1 Introduction
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This chapter examines the impact of Pilot provision on job quality. Four aspects
of job quality are analysed:
• job satisfaction
• satisfaction with and types of training
• wages and wage progression
• job stability.
The chapter is structured as follows. These are analysed in each of the next four
sections, while the final section concludes.
4.2 Job satisfaction
Respondents who were in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview were
asked how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with their job. They could choose








Table 4.1 presents the percentages for each response category and compares
these for the Pilot and comparison samples. Generally job satisfaction was very
high. Well over 80 per cent were satisfied (first three categories) and less than
10 per cent reported dissatisfaction with their job (last three categories). There
were no large differences between the Pilot and comparison samples, other than
that the latter were somewhat more likely to report complete satisfaction with
their job (30 per cent against 25 per cent), while the former were more likely to
be fairly satisfied.
So that Pilot effects on job satisfaction could be analysed through the matching
technique, a ‘mean score’ of job satisfaction was created using the categorical
responses. Each of the categories was assigned a number: ‘completely satisfied’
= 1, ‘very satisfied’ = 2, ‘fairly satisfied’ = 3, …, ‘completely dissatisfied’ = 7.
Thus, the categorical variable was transformed into a numerical one. It was now
possible to calculate an average of job satisfaction: the mean score. The higher
the mean score the lower job satisfaction. The average score for the Pilot
sample was 2.37, whereas for the comparison sample it was 2.27. This indicates
a somewhat lower average level of job satisfaction among those members of the
Pilot sample who were in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview.
Table 4.1 Job satisfaction by sample – descriptive statistics
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Column %s
Level of job satisfaction Pilot Comparison All
Completely satisfied 25 30 27
Very satisfied 33 34 34




Fairly dissatisfied 3 2 3
Very dissatisfied 2 3 2
Completely dissatisfied 1 1 1
Weighted base 306 172 478
Re-matching analyses were carried out to test whether this difference remained
when employed members of the Pilot sample were matched to their closest
employed comparators from within the comparison sample. Table 4.2 reports the
results of these analyses.






Mean score derived from
job satisfaction scale
-0.27 (5%) 478
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance
The analyses based on matching confirm the position suggested by the
descriptive statistics, that Pilot provision is associated with lower levels of job
satisfaction. This suggests that, while Pilot provision is able to encourage
movements into work (see Chapter Two), this is at some cost in terms of job
quality. In order to provide a more informed interpretation of this finding,
however, it is necessary to examine other indicators of job quality, such as
wages. This is done in later sections.
4.3 Satisfaction with training and type of training
Satisfaction with Training
Respondents were asked whether they had received any training in jobs held at
the time of the stage 2 survey. As was shown in Chapter Three, about a third of
employed respondents had received work-based training, with little variation
between Pilot and comparison areas. Satisfaction with this training was
measured in the same way as job satisfaction. Again results are reported as
percentage of answers in each category. The results are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Satisfaction with work-based training – descriptive statistics
Column
percentages









Very satisfied 38 43 40




Fairly dissatisfied 0 3 3




Weighted base 81 35 116
Again, levels of satisfaction with training were remarkably high, with over 90 per
cent of recipients expressing satisfaction and virtually no one reporting
dissatisfaction. While both Pilot and comparison sample respondents reported
high levels of satisfaction, there was a difference in the pattern of their
responses. Members of the comparison sample were somewhat more likely to
say they were ‘very satisfied’ (43 per cent against 38 per cent), whereas Pilot
respondents had a greater tendency to say they were ‘fairly satisfied’ (30 per
cent against 20 per cent). A mean score was derived on this varied in the same
way as for job satisfaction. The means score for Pilot respondents was 2.06
whereas for comparison sample respondents it was 2.10. The difference
between these scores was not statistically significant, suggesting there was no
difference between the Pilot and comparison samples with regard to their
satisfaction with training. Sample numbers were too low to explore this further
through a matching analysis.
Type of training
As well as asking respondents about satisfaction with training, the stage 2 survey
enquired about the type of work-based training undertaken. Of particular interest
is whether the training helped towards a qualification. Such training, leading to
some kind of formal accreditation, might be expected to be of more lasting
benefit to the recipient’s employment prospects than more informal training.
About two-thirds (67 per cent) of Pilot respondents who received training said it
helped towards a qualification, compared to six in 10 members of the
comparison sample who received training. This comparison was based on a very
small number of respondents (116) however, and was not statistically significant.
Sample numbers were too low to carry out a matching analysis on this question.
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4.4 Wages and wage progression
Wages
Most research in labour economics suggests there is a positive correlation
between pay and productivity, so that a positive programme impact on wages
could be taken to indicate that the programme is promoting greater productivity
and efficiency (Polachek and Siebert (1993). At the same time, government
programmes have sometimes been accused of coercing claimants into accepting
jobs with lower wages than they would otherwise have accepted (White,
Lissenburgh and Bryson, 1997). The analysis in this section is able to show
whether either of these effects is discernible in relation to ND25+ Pilot provision.
Of the 548 respondents in employment at the time of the stage 2 survey, 434 (79
per cent) were able to provide credible information on the net hourly pay they
earned in that job. Comparison sample members earned more, on average, than
Pilot participants (£4.78 per hour against £4.54) but this difference was not
statistically reliable. There were sufficient survey respondents in employment
and providing wage data to carry out a re-matching analysis, in order to estimate
whether there were any wage differences by sample that could be attributed to
Pilot participation. Table 4.4 contains the results of this analysis.
Table 4.4  Pilot effects on wages – analysis based on matching
Measure of wages Pilot effect (£ per hour) Weighted base
Net hourly rate -0.71 (n.s.) 434
Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
While the matching analyses confirm the lower earnings of Pilot participants
relative to the comparison sample, the difference of 71 pence per hour is not
statistically significant. There is no evidence from this analysis, therefore, that
Pilot participation either boosts or depresses wages.
Wage progression
It is also of interest to examine wage progression from the stage 1 to the stage 2
interview. Wage growth can be seen as an indicator of high quality jobs whereas
wage stagnation or decline could suggest that respondents ended up in dead-
end jobs with little prospects of improving the situation.
Table 4.5 summarises the results. The number of observations fell dramatically
as relatively few respondents held jobs at both the stage 1 and stage 2
interviews. In fact, only 91 respondents did so. Due to these sample restrictions
the analysis is of an ‘anecdotal’ nature and results have to be interpreted with
caution.
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Stage 1 3.92 3.93 3.93
Stage 2 4.19 4.30 4.23
Progression 0.27 0.37 0.30
Weighted base 61 31 91
This small subsample of respondents employed (and able to provide wage data)
at both the stage 1 and stage 2 surveys started off at stage 1 with almost
identical mean net wage rates of around £3.93 per hour. By stage 2, more
growth had been exhibited by the comparison sample, whose wages rose by 37
pence per hour (nine per cent), compared with growth for the Pilot sample of 27
pence per hour (seven per cent). This difference was too small to be statistically
significant, however, especially given the small sample sizes.
While the results were gained from a very restricted and small subsample of the
survey, it seemed to be the case, on the whole, that respondents experienced
wage growth rather than wage decline or wage stagnation. There was no reliable
evidence, however, of faster or slower wage growth on the part of Pilot
participants.
4.5 Job stability
An important aspect of job quality is whether the job is likely to last a reasonable
amount of time. Respondents who were in employment at the time of the stage 2
interview were asked whether they thought their job was ‘a permanent one’, ‘a
seasonal, temporary or casual one’, ‘a job done under contract for a limited
period of time’ or ‘a job that is in some other way not permanent’. Table 4.6
shows how the answers differed by sample.








Fixed-term contract 8 4 6
Other non-permanent 4 2 3
Weighted base 304 169 473
The greater majority of employed respondents thought their job was stable, with
eight in 10 saying it was ‘permanent’. This proportion did not vary appreciably
ND25+ Pilots: quantitative evaluation using stage 2 survey
l
across samples. The other categories had correspondingly fewer incumbents,
although just over one in 10 said their jobs were temporary, seasonal or casual.
A re-matching analysis was carried out with employed respondents to test
whether there were any differences in the degree of job stability by sample that
could be attributed to Pilot participation. These analyses estimated mean
differences in the proportion of respondents in the two samples who said their
job was permanent, as opposed to any of the three ‘non-permanent’ categories.
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 4.7.
 Table 4.7 Pilot effects on job stability – analysis based on matching






Note: figures in brackets indicate statistically significant effect and the level of
significance; n.s. means non-significant
As the descriptive statistics suggested, the difference between Pilot participants
and their matched comparators with regard to perceived job stability was very
small. Pilot participants were a little more likely to perceive their job as
permanent, but by less than two percentage points. Such a small difference was,
of course, not statistically significant.
4.6 Conclusion
As was the case with the analyses of employability, very few differences
emerged between the Pilot and comparison samples in relation to the quality of
jobs they held at the time of the stage 2 survey. The only reliable difference was
that Pilot entrants had lower levels of job satisfaction than their comparators.
There were no differences between the samples, however, in relation to wages
or wage progression. This finding is consistent with that of higher wage
expectations reported for Pilot participants in Chapter Three. Given their higher
wage expectations, Pilot participants would perhaps be expected to show lower
levels of satisfaction with jobs that paid no more than those of their comparators.
5. Conclusion
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The purpose of this final chapter is to draw together the chief findings of the
evaluation and place them in perspective.
The main findings of the evaluation can be grouped into three categories:-
• Pilot effects on employment entry and exit from JSA
• Pilot effects on employability
• Pilot effects on job quality
Pilot effects on employment entry and exit from JSA
Analyses based on matching in the context of a matched comparison group
evaluation design produced the following main findings:-
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants out of
unemployment. This was the case for the evaluation period as a whole and
for 1999 and 2000 considered separately. Effects were found in relation to
both exits from JSA and time off JSA, so that once the programme had
enabled participants to leave unemployment, they tended not to return.
• Pilot provision was effective in encouraging participants to enter employment.
• Pilot effects on both employment entry and unemployment exit were stronger
for this cohort in 1999 than in 2000. Indeed, Pilot effects on employment
entry had become non-significant in 2000 for this cohort. The diminution of
the Pilot advantage over the comparison sample in terms of employment
entry and unemployment exit could be due either to the atrophy of Pilot
effects or to a ‘catching-up’ process on the part of the comparison group. The
available evidence suggested the latter was more likely. Pilot respondents
had higher employment entry and unemployment exit levels in 2000 than
1999, but by this year many members of the comparison group had
accumulated substantial experience under the national New Deal for the
Long Term Unemployed (ND25+) programme, which after April 2000 was
improved so that the Gateway more closely resembled that in the Pilots. It is
perhaps not surprising that a reduction of the Pilot advantage coincided with
many members of the comparison sample receiving assistance that included
some elements of Pilot provision.
Attempts were also made to estimate the separate impact of different elements
of Pilot provision, especially the Gateway and Intensive Activity Period (IAP).
This proved particularly difficult in relation to the former, but it was possible to
establish that both had a discernible impact and that movements off JSA from
the Gateway were almost certainly more pronounced than from the IAP. The
effect of IAP seemed more sustained, however, and was not weakening at the
end of the evaluation period.
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It was also possible to establish that Pilot provision was effective in both 12 month entry
and 18 month entry areas but there was no indication that intervention at 12 months was
more effective than at 18 months, or vice-versa. This result is somewhat surprising given
that internal ES monitoring of Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System data
has consistently shown that 18 month intervention is more effective than at 12 months in
terms of off-flows from JSA. The finding of no significant differences between 12 and 18
month intervention in this research might stem from the fact that people in the 18 month
comparison group became eligible for national New Deal provision sooner than those in
the 12 month comparison group, thus reducing the 18 month effect.
Among New Deal opportunities, positive effects were found for Employer
Subsidy but Education and Training Opportunities and Work Based Learning for
Adults had a negative or no impact.
Pilot effects on employability
Raising participants’ employability is one of the primary ways in which an active
labour market programme can influence job entry chances beyond the
immediate evaluation period. This is because improving employability implies
developing the skills and capacities likely to increase participants’ labour market
prospects over the medium- to long-term.
The analyses of employability focused primarily, therefore, on respondents who
were not in employment at the time of the stage 2 interview. These respondents
are ones who have found it relatively hard to enter work during the evaluation
period, so analyses of employability are particularly important for them. In the
absence of objective measures of employability, measures of in-work training,
qualifications, job search, self-efficacy and attachment to the labour market were
derived from survey responses and used as proxies for ‘employability’.
Analysing self-assessed measures of employability of this type provided very
little evidence to suggest that Pilot provision had raised employability. The only
significant effect detected was that Pilot entrants had higher wage expectations
than their comparators. This is more likely to reduce their chances of entering
work over the medium- to long-term rather than increase it, because having
higher wage expectations reduces the range of job offers a person is likely to find
acceptable. While higher wage expectations may be evidence of greater self-
confidence on the part of Pilot participants, this conclusion was not supported by
the analysis of self-efficacy. What is perhaps more likely is that the greater
effectiveness of Pilot provision raised expectations with regard to programme
impacts and these encouraged participants to have higher wage expectations. A
paradox of the programme is that raising expectations in this way might make it
harder for those participants who do not enter employment in the short-term to
do so in the medium- to long-term, because these higher expectations will make
the participants less employable.
ND25+ Pilots: quantitative evaluation using stage 2 survey
liii
Pilot effects on job quality
As was the case with the analyses of employability, very few differences
emerged between the Pilot and comparison samples in relation to the quality of
jobs they held at the time of the stage 2 survey. The only reliable difference was
that Pilot entrants had lower levels of job satisfaction than their comparators.
There were no differences between the samples, however, in relation to wages
or wage progression. This finding is consistent with that of higher wage
expectations reported for Pilot participants, referred to above. Given their higher
wage expectations, Pilot participants would perhaps be expected to show lower
levels of satisfaction with jobs that paid no more than those of their comparators.
Conclusions
Taken together, these findings present a comprehensive picture of how Pilot
provision affected recipients’ labour market experiences during a relatively short
period after the introduction of the programme. The weight of evidence suggests
that the Pilots were able to quickly improve the labour market prospects of many
participants, as shown by the positive Pilot effects on job entry, JSA exit and time
off JSA in the first year of the evaluation period, 1999. It is not possible to say
how long these large effects would have persisted if the comparison sample had
continued to receive little assistance from employment programmes in the
second half of the evaluation period, but as they started to spend more time on
New Deal in 2000 the Pilot effects lessened and, in the case of employment
effects, disappeared.
The analyses of employability gave no suggestion that Pilot participants who had
not found a job before the end of the evaluation period would have more success
in this regard than similar people from the comparison sample over the next few
years. ND25+ Pilot provision did not seem to enhance employability, at least as
proxied by survey responses on items such as in-work training, qualifications, job
search, self-efficacy and attachment to the labour market, in the way that some
elements of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) programme have done.
This suggests that the positive Pilot effects identified in this report represent a
large proportion of the overall advantage over the comparison sample likely to be
enjoyed by this cohort of participants. To some extent, this is consistent with the
more intensive, work-first ethos of ND25+ Pilot provision compared with, for
example, NDYP. As a programme of this type, there is considerable evidence to
suggest it has been a success.
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